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ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING: WHO 
DETERMINES THE VALUE OF OTHER LIFE? 
FRANCISCO BENZONI† 
I.  STANDING AND VALUE 
The constitutional requirements for standing articulated by the 
Supreme Court impose a fiercely contested theory of value on the 
democratic polity.  These requirements (of injury-in-fact, causation, 
and redressability) are threshold requirements that must be met by 
the human plaintiff in order for a federal court to hear the case.  
Because they are constitutional in nature, these requirements trump 
any statutory grant of standing to citizens to stand in for ecosystems 
or other life that is injured by activities that are statutorily prohibited.  
For instance, a statute (such as the Endangered Species Act) may 
grant protection to a given species and grant citizens’ standing to sue 
to enforce these protections.  Nevertheless, the courts cannot hear a 
case brought by a citizen in which such a species is injured by 
activities alleged to be prohibited unless the human plaintiff can show 
that he or she was also injured by those activities.  Further, the injury 
must be shown to be caused by the activity in question and the 
plaintiff must show that the injury would be likely to be redressed if 
the activity was stopped.1 
Such requirements, at least in those cases where the agency with 
enforcement power fails to act, effectively remove other life or 
ecosystems from any direct claim to justice in our legal system.  A 
claim to justice is premised at least in part on the value of the parties.  
Therefore, the constitutional standing doctrine amounts to a judicial 
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 1. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (holding that when “a 
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else . . . it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing 
that [the] choices [of that third party] have been or will be made in such manner as to produce 
causation and permit redressability of injury”). 
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imposition of a theory of value in which human beings are the source 
and center of value.2 
The scope of citizens’ suit provisions in environmental 
regulations have been significantly curtailed by the standing doctrine, 
with its constitutional requirements that the plaintiff show injury-in-
fact, causation, and redressability.3  Ironically, the most basic 
rationale for the standing doctrine is the separation of powers 
between the branches of the federal government.4  The Supreme 
Court explained that standing “is founded in concern about the 
 2. This judicial imposition of a human-centered value system is well-illustrated in an en 
banc case from the D.C. Circuit, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 
(1998).  In that case, Marc Jurnove, an individual who was trained in the care of animals and 
highly concerned about their welfare, contended that a number of animals at the Long Island 
Game Farm Park and Zoo were being treated unlawfully under the Animal Welfare Act 
(AWA). Id. at 428.  (Note that the Animal Welfare Act does not have a citizens’ suit provision, 
so this suit was brought under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  But the 
constitutional standing analysis, our concern here, is identical either way.)  Jurnove specifically 
challenged then-current USDA regulations that allegedly permitted the conditions of which he 
complained.  Id. at 430.  But, in order to have standing to bring suit, Jurnove could not argue on 
the basis of the injurious treatment to the animals – the object of his concern – even though that 
treatment was allegedly illegal under the AWA.  Neither could he argue that he suffered a 
moral or ethical injury by the treatment, since the courts have not recognized such an injury 
(and it would probably come too close to “ideological injury” for the courts).  Therefore, 
Jurnove had to establish that he suffered “aesthetic injury” by the mistreatment of these 
animals.  Id. at 428-29, 434.  The majority of the court found that injury-in-fact was established 
by Jurnove’s aesthetic injury.  Id. at 429.  But there is something troubling, even offensive, about 
this finding.  It diverts attention from Jurnove’s concern, from the concern about the well-being 
of other life, to Jurnove’s well-being.  And the court orders a remedy, not to heal the injury to 
the animals, but in order that Jurnove’s aesthetic tastes will no longer receive offense by the way 
these animals are treated.  Like the citizens’ suit provisions of environmental statutes, the 
court’s inquiry should focus on whether the APA, together with the relevant agency action, give 
Jurnove a cause of action.  The court’s focus on injury-in-fact is muddled, inconsistent, and 
offensive to those who do not adhere to the implied theory of value. 
 3. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 4. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 752 (1984); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).  The 
Supreme Court has also justified standing requirements on several additional bases.  Standing 
serves judicial efficiency since it holds back the floodgates against those who have only an 
ideological, rather than a personal, particularized, stake in the outcome of the suit.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (Powell, J., concurring).  Further, standing is 
purported to ensure that individuals raise only their own rights and do not intermeddle with the 
rights of others – seeking to protect what the other does not want protected.  See, e.g., Singleton 
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).  Finally, the standing requirement is purported to sharpen 
and focus judicial decision-making.  As the Court put it in Baker v. Carr, standing requires a 
plaintiff to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (cited in 
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007)). 
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proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in a democratic 
society.”5  By requiring that plaintiffs meet the requirements of 
standing, the Court arguably confines its own activity to justiciable 
cases and controversies and so keeps the Court out of the policy-
making arena properly conferred on the elected branches of 
government.  These requirements are also purported to prevent the 
other branches from infringing on each others’ constitutionally 
delegated powers; in particular, they prevent Congress from 
delegating to the courts the executive task of carrying out legislative 
mandates or enforcing the law.6 
In the context of environmental regulations (such as the 
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water 
Act) that protect, at least in part, ecosystems and other life, citizens’ 
suit provisions allow for individuals to meet statutory standing 
requirements by suing on account of injury to ecosystems or other 
life.  The Court, however, has explicitly rejected this construal as 
failing to meet the constitutional requirements for Article III 
standing.  In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc.,7 the Court explained, “[t]he relevant showing 
for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the 
environment but injury to the plaintiff.”8  Even if the relevant statute 
prohibits activity that results in injury to a river, a species, or an 
ecosystem, the courts will only hear the case if the human plaintiff can 
demonstrate that she has suffered a particularized, concrete injury (or 
injury-in-fact) as a result of (i.e. causation) the prohibited activity.  
Further, it is the injury to the human plaintiff that must be likely to be 
redressed by a favorable ruling. 
The standing doctrine, then, has the odd effect of placing the 
human plaintiff before the court, with the injury to the ecosystem or 
other life that is prohibited by the relevant statute as relevant only to 
the extent this environmental injury also injures the human plaintiff 
and to the extent that healing this environmental injury redresses the 
injury to human plaintiff.  The ecosystem and other life, in other 
words, become a backdrop for the human drama of injury and 
healing.  To be sure, many interpretations of the constitutional 
provisions involve value judgments.  However, by separating human 
 5. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
 6. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. 
 7. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 8. Id. at 181. 
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beings from the rest of nature, the current standing doctrine stands 
out for its wholesale imposition of a thoroughgoing and powerfully 
contested theory of value.  And since it is on such values that a 
democratic polity adopts policies for how we structure our lives 
together, the assumption of any such value theory is best left to the 
elected branches of government. 
This standing doctrine has deep ethical significance.  It is usually 
considered a matter of justice that those injured by legally cognizable 
wrongs have recourse to the courts to be made whole.  The Court’s 
use of the standing doctrine effectively removes ecosystems and other 
life from any direct claim to justice.9  This amounts to the judicial 
institutionalization of a theory of value in which human beings are the 
source and center of value.  The problem is not so much whether such 
a value theory is tenable.  Rather, the problem is that by imposing a 
particular theory of value on a democratic polity, the Supreme Court 
(on almost any account of the Courts’ role) has transgressed its 
proper boundaries and usurped a legislative, and properly 
democratic, function.  It is part of the function of the legislature, in 
free and open debate, to determine the principles of justice, and the 
theory (or theories) of value, that order our lives together. 
The effects of the Court’s position are not simply theoretical.  On 
the contrary, if courts hold that there is no injury in the destruction of 
other life or of an ecosystem, absent direct injury to human beings, it 
is difficult to muster the resources and commitments necessary to 
actively protect against such “environmental” injury.  The current 
standing doctrine also forces environmentalists to couch their claims 
in terms of human self-interest.  More than thirty years ago, Laurence 
Tribe pointed out the danger of this approach: “What the 
environmentalist may not perceive is that, by couching his claim in 
terms of human self-interest – by articulating environmental goals 
wholly in terms of human needs and preferences – he may be helping 
to legitimate a system of discourse which so structures human thought 
and feeling as to erode, over the long run, the very sense of obligation 
which provided the impetus for his own protective efforts.”10  This 
yields what Tribe calls a “metamorphosis of obligation into self-
interest and personal preference.”11  Tribe’s point, in part, is that the 
way we speak influences the way we think. Couching arguments in 
 9. As noted, this is at least true where the relevant agency fails to act. 
 10. Laurence Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for 
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330-31 (1974). 
 11. Id. at 1331. 
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terms of human preferences, as the standing doctrine forces us to do, 
can erode the very values that bring us to feel an obligation to 
ecosystems and other life.  Even when one’s concern with injury to 
other life is ethical, to be legally cognizable it must be put in terms of 
human injury, such as a recreational injury or an aesthetic injury, 
which fundamentally distorts the ethical dimension of the 
experienced reality. 
In this paper, I begin with an articulation of the development of 
the current standing doctrine.  I then argue that this doctrine is 
logically untenable, constitutionally unsupported, and undermined by 
our legal history. 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE 
Historically, the right to bring suit had been closely tied to 
recognized common-law injuries arising from contract disputes, 
property disputes, or tort.  The early, embryonic form of standing as a 
distinct doctrine occurred during the 1920s and 1930s, against the 
background of a heated debate about the constitutionality of the 
administrative state, with its myriad regulations.12  Justices Brandeis 
and Frankfurter, with their overlapping tenures, led the Court in the 
development of this doctrine.  Their goal was to limit an aggressive 
judicial attack on progressive and New Deal legislation by erecting 
procedural barriers to such attacks.13 
The Supreme Court first articulated the bar to citizen and 
taxpayer standing during these years.  For instance, in 1923, in 
Frothingham v. Mellon, the plaintiff sued, as a taxpayer, to restrain 
federal expenditures under the Maternity Act of 1921, an Act 
intended to reduce infant and maternal mortality.14  The plaintiff 
claimed that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.  The Court 
denied standing, holding that the plaintiff alleged no injury to a legal 
right beyond suffering in an indefinite way in common with people 
generally.  The Court held, 
 12. Perhaps ironically, the Justices who now seek to rein in citizens’ suits that challenge 
agency actions are viewed by many as too friendly to industry.  But they find themselves, to 
some degree, in alignment with earlier Justices who developed the standing doctrine to protect 
agency decisions from attack or interference by industry. 
 13. See, e.g., Robert Pushaw, Jr. Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist 
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 396 (1996) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter played a 
central role in designing the standing doctrine). 
 14. 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923). 
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We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on 
the ground that they are unconstitutional.  That question may be 
considered only when the justification for some direct injury 
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest 
upon such an act.  Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining 
and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.  It amounts to 
little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional 
enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the 
enforcement of a legal right.  The party who invokes the power 
must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he 
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.15 
If someone (1) has a legal right, (2) is in danger of sustaining, or 
has sustained, an injury to that right by the enforcement of a statute, 
and (3) the individual alleges that the statute is invalid, then (4) that 
individual has standing to sue.16  The Court in this case did not link 
these requirements to Article III; rather, they followed the line from 
common law demanding a cause of action or a legal right that has 
been or will be violated, with the additional concern of “generalized 
grievances,” that accompanied the rise of the administrative state.  
The plaintiff needs to show an injury beyond the claim of some 
indefinite suffering shared by all the population.17  Taxpayers, in 
general, do not have standing to sue to challenge federal expenditures 
because their interests are comparatively minute and their purported 
injury is shared by the general population.18  Similarly, in 1937, the 
Court ruled that a plaintiff could not gain standing merely from the 
claim that he had a right to have the government follow the laws.19  
“[I]t is not sufficient [for standing],” the Court held, “that he has 
 15. Id. at 488.  In a companion case disposed at the same time the Court denied the State of 
Massachusetts standing to challenge the same Act.  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 
(1923) (holding that the plaintiff “must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of [the] enforcement [of the 
challenged statute], and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with 
people generally”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 487-88. 
 18. Id. at 487. 
 19. Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).  The early standing guidelines hewed roughly to 
preexisting law.  For instance, in Tenn Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 
(1939), the Court held that unless a plaintiff had “a legal right, —one of property, one arising 
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which 
confers a privilege,” there was no cause of action.  (quoted by Laveta Casdorph, The 
Constitution and Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L. J. 471, 488 (1998)). 
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merely a general interest common to all members of the public.”20 
Frothingham and Leavitt establish the bar to taxpayer and citizen 
standing.  But they do not hold that these are Article III requirements 
and they do not address the situation where there is a statutory grant 
of standing, leaving open the possibility that Congress could override 
these decisions for particular purposes in a given statute. 
It was not until 1944 in Stark v. Wickard that the Court made its 
first reference to standing as an Article III limitation.21  The next case 
that made a similar reference did not come until 1952 in Adler V. 
Board of Education.22  In that case, an employee of the New York 
City Board of Education brought a suit seeking a determination that 
a New York law was unconstitutional, and seeking to enjoin the 
Board of Education from implementing it.  The majority found no 
constitutional infirmity in the statute.23  Justice Frankfurter, in his 
dissenting opinion, argued that “we should adhere to the teaching of 
this Court’s history to avoid constitutional adjudications on merely 
abstract or speculative issues and to base them on the concreteness 
afforded by an actual, present, defined controversy, appropriate for 
judicial judgment, between adversaries immediately affected by it.”24  
He argued that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited “by the 
settled construction of Article III of the Constitution.  We cannot 
entertain, as we again recognize this very day, a constitutional claim 
at the instance [sic] of one whose interest has no material significance 
and is undifferentiated from the mass of his fellow citizens.”25  
Apparently, by that date, at least in the mind of Justice Frankfurter, 
the plaintiff’s interest must be materially significant and differentiated 
from a generalized grievance to meet the constitutional requirements 
for standing.26  Though now elevated to constitutional requirements, 
this position is consistent with the claim that standing is conferred so 
 20. 302 U.S. at 634. 
 21. 321 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1944) (“[U]nder Article III, Congress established courts to 
adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights . . .  We 
merely determine the petitioners have shown a right to a judicial examination of their 
complaint.”) (cited by Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L REV. 163, 169 (1992)). 
 22. 342 U.S. 485, 501 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 496. 
 24. Id. at 497-498. 
 25. Id. at 501 (emphases added). 
 26. Note that, in Adler v. Board of Education, as in Stark v. Wickard, the claims concerning 
the lack of material interest or significance largely overlapped with the lack of differentiation 
from the larger public or the generalized nature of the claim. 
  
354 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:347 
 
long as the law – either common law or statute – has conferred upon 
the plaintiff a cause of action, giving her the required interest. 
By the mid-1950s, the focus of the Court had “shifted from 
regulatory to civil rights issues.”27  As the Warren Court expanded 
individual rights and sought a constitutional grounding for them, the 
Court liberally interpreted statutes to expand the doctrine of 
standing.28  In 1968, the Court dramatically broadened access to the 
courts to challenge government action.  In Flast v. Cohen,29 the Court 
upheld taxpayer standing to challenge federal expenditures that went 
to parochial schools as violating the Establishment Clause.  Both the 
majority and the dissent agreed that the rule preventing the Court 
from hearing generalized grievances was prudential rather than 
constitutional.30  The majority distinguished Frothingham by arguing 
that the First Amendment, but not the Tenth Amendment (which was 
at issue in Frothingham), was a limit on the taxing and spending 
authority of Congress.31  The Court held that “in terms of Article III 
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is 
related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be 
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as 
capable of judicial resolution.”32  The Court’s emphasis in this 
standing decision was on “adverseness” rather than “separation of 
powers.”  However, the standard articulated such a high level of 
generality that probably most disputes could be described as 
“adverse” and whether the form was one “historically capable of 
judicial resolution” provided little guidance.  The Burger Court 
subsequently moved essentially to limit Flast to the facts of the case 
rather than allowing broad-based taxpayer standing.33 
The insistence that Article III requires injury-in-fact, causation, 
and redressability was not a part of the judicial landscape until the 
 27. Casdorph, supra note 19, at 489. 
 28. Id. at 489-91. 
 29. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 30. Id. at 101, 119-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 105. 
 32. Id. at 101. 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (holding that the 
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge statutes providing secrecy for the CIA’s budget as 
violating the Constitution’s requirement of regular accounting for all expenditures because he 
was not suing on the basis of a personal right, but only as a citizen and taxpayer with a 
generalized grievance).  The Court deemed it irrelevant that the plaintiff claimed that if he 
could not sue, no one could.  Id. at 179. 
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1970s.34  In 1970, two events took place that, at the time, seemed to 
have little to do with each other: (1) the Clean Air Act amendments 
introduced citizen enforcement suits into environmental statutory 
law,35 and (2) the Supreme Court, in two opinions by Justice Douglas 
handed down on the same day, introduced “injury-in-fact” into 
standing jurisprudence.36  Virtually every piece of environmental 
legislation that followed the Clean Air Act, including the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, included a citizens’ suit provision to compel 
agency action to comply with the law and to allow citizens’ 
enforcement actions against private individuals.37  Through the 1970s, 
the standing doctrine grew alongside the citizens’ suit provision. 
Originally intended to continue the process of broadening 
plaintiffs’ access to the courts, the Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp38 
ironically provided the framework for the most restrictive 
requirements in the (comparatively brief) history of the doctrine.39  
The petitioners in Data Processing, who sold computer services to 
businesses, challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of Currency that 
allowed banks to make available data processing services to 
customers and other banks.40  The lower court had dismissed the case, 
holding that the plaintiff lacked standing.41  In reversing the lower 
court, the Supreme Court argued, “[w]here statutes are concerned, 
the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may 
protest administrative action.  The whole drive for enlarging the 
category of aggrieved ‘persons’ is symptomatic of that trend.”42 
 34. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 168. 
 35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706 (1970). 
 36. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 37. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(a) (2002); Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (2006); Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1) (2006); Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) 
(2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-8 (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
6972 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006 and Supp. 1990); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 
Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 60121 (2006); and others. 
 38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 39. Casdorph, supra note 19, at 492-93. 
 40. 397 U.S. at 151. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 154. 
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To facilitate this trend, the Court separated the issue of standing 
from the “legal interest” test which, it held, went to the merits.43  For 
the issue of standing, the Court held, “[t]he first question is whether 
the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury 
in fact, economic or otherwise.”44  Instead of examining the governing 
law to see if Congress had created a legal interest, the Court would 
perform an independent standing inquiry that would turn on the facts 
rather than the law.  Since Data Processing, injury-in-fact has been 
taken as one of the three constitutional requirements for meeting the 
Article III standard for cases or controversies.  The question of 
whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact was separated from 
the merits of the case and determined before the court got to the 
merits.  It is a threshold matter that the courts must resolve to hear 
the case. 
The next major development in the standing doctrine came in 
1975.  In Warth v. Seldin,45 four classes of plaintiffs challenged the 
zoning ordinances of Pensfield, New York, that they claimed 
excluded low- and moderate-income housing.  The Court denied 
standing to all four classes because, the Court held, they were unable 
to establish a nexus between the ordinance and their claimed injury; 
that is, the plaintiffs failed to show that, absent the ordinances, they 
would have been able to afford housing in Penfield.  The Court never 
reached the merits of the case because the majority held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the 
ordinance and the claimed injury.  The Court stated, “The Art. III 
judicial power exists only to redress [redressability] or otherwise to 
protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the 
court’s judgment may benefit others collaterally.  A federal court’s 
jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself 
has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from 
[causation] the putatively illegal action.”46  Since then, the three 
 43. Id. at 153. 
 44. Id. at 152.  This case also first articulated the “zone of interest” test as a prudential 
standing requirement for cases brought under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  See 
Casdorph, supra note 19, at 493-94.  Since this paper’s focus is on (1) citizens’ suits (which make 
the Administrative Procedures Act unnecessary for bringing a suit) and (2) the constitutional 
requirements for standing, we will not explore this aspect of the case. 
 45. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
 46. Id. at 499 (emphases added) (citations and quotations omitted).  See also Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42 (1976) (holding that, as a constitutional matter, 
the claimed injury must be one that “fairly can be traced” to the defendant’s actions and that 
the injury is likely to be “redressed by a favorable decision”). 
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constitutional requirements to meet Article III standing have been 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.47 
In 1992, the citizens’ suit provisions of environmental statutes 
and the (now) constitutional requirements of standing clashed 
dramatically in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.48 Nine years earlier, in 
1983, then-Judge Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia, published an article, “The Doctrine of Standing 
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,”49 whose 
reasoning would become that of the Supreme Court in Lujan.  Judge 
Scalia stated that his “thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is 
a crucial and inseparable element of . . . [the] principle [of separation 
of powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce – as it has during 
the past few decades – an overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance.  More specifically, I suggest that courts need to accord 
greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional 
requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one, 
which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.”50  In Lujan, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, echoed this reasoning.  The 
Interior Department had promulgated a regulation that required 
consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high 
seas, exempting from the Endangered Species Act actions by U.S. 
government taken overseas.  The plaintiffs in Lujan claimed that the 
U.S. government funded activities abroad which would increase the 
rate of extinction of threatened or endangered species, so that the 
regulation at issue was against the provisions of the Endangered 
Species Act.  Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, noted that the 
first constitutional requirement of standing is that “the plaintiff must 
have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”51  He added in a footnote 
that the injury, to be particularized, “must affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way.”52 
When the plaintiff is herself the object of an action, this will 
generally not be a hurdle.  But when “a plaintiff’s asserted injury 
 47. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99. 
 48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 49. Scalia, supra note 4. 
 50. Id. at 881-82. 
 51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 560, n.1. 
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arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.”53  In Lujan, the 
plaintiffs’ claim to injury was that two of the plaintiffs had traveled to 
foreign countries and observed endangered animals in their native 
habitat, and these animals were now threatened with extinction by 
the action of the U.S. government.54  Both plaintiffs claimed that they 
intended to go back and would be harmed if the animals were to 
become extinct.  The Court ruled that the plaintiffs had not shown 
how damage to the animals would produce any imminent injury to the 
plaintiffs since they did not have any definite, concrete plans to 
return.55  The Court held that the injury-in-fact requirement of Article 
III standing invalidated the explicit congressional grant of standing to 
citizens in the Endangered Species Act (and presumably in other 
environmental statutes).  Congress can create statutory standing only 
if there is also injury-in-fact.  The Court noted that it does not make 
any difference that the Endangered Species Act was intended, in part, 
to provide a means by which to preserve ecosystems on which 
endangered or threatened species depend.56  “To say that the Act 
protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were 
possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact, 
that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly 
affected by the unlawful action in question.”57 
The Court explicitly rejected citizens’ suit provisions, common to 
environmental statutes, as a means of gaining standing: 
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of 
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in 
our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the 
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch . . . 
‘The province of the court,’ as Chief Justice Marshall said in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60 
 53. Id. at 562.  As Judge Scalia had put it nine years earlier, “when an individual who is the 
very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has 
standing. . . .  Contrast that classic form of court challenge with the increasingly frequent 
administrative law cases in which the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure to 
impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else.” Scalia, supra note 4, at 894. 
 54. 504 U.S. at 562-64. 
 55. Id. at 564.  As the dissent points out, this requirement is likely an “empty formality” 
since it could be satisfied by the simple expedient of purchasing plane tickets to the designated 
locations.  Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 56. Through its standing jurisprudence, then, the Court has effectively imposed an 
anthropocentric value theory through its doctrine of standing.  Persons, not ecosystems, must be 
injured in order to have standing to sue on behalf of ecosystems whose health the relevant law is 
intended to protect. 
 57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565. 
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(1803), ‘is, solely, to decide the rights of individuals.’ Vindicating 
the public interest (including the public interest in Government 
observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive.  The question presented here is 
whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws 
(specifically, in agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily 
prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by 
a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens 
(or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive 
concrete harm) to sue.  If the concrete injury requirement has the 
separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer 
must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the 
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance 
with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to 
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the 
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.58 
Congress, the Court held, cannot convert the public interest in 
the proper administration of laws into an individual right that permits 
all individuals to sue.  Article III standing requirements, and 
especially the requirement of “injury-in-fact,” prohibit this conversion 
because it would violate the separation of powers and make the 
courts “monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”59 
Though the Court in subsequent decisions has backpedaled from 
the stringent application of the “concrete injury” requirement for 
standing, in what one commentator has called a move from “injury-
in-fact” to “injury-in-fiction,”60 it remains confined to the boundaries 
it set for itself in the three constitutional requirements for standing – 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.  This confinement is 
reflected in recent decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, where both the 
majority and the dissent argue within these boundaries.  The 
disagreement among the Justices stems from their differing 
interpretation of how stringently to apply these terms.  The Court 
uses its test for standing to determine the constitutionality of the 
 58. Id. at 576-77.  Steven L. Winter has aptly called this Scalia’s “imperial vision of the law” 
in which the citizens and ostensible rulers are left as passive and alienated subjects, with the 
imperial executive having not just the power to enforce the law, but the exclusive power for such 
enforcement.  Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law 
Seriously? 12 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 155, 163 (1993). Winter points out several other 
problems with Scalia’s argument, such as its tension with the very notion of “rule of law.”  Id. at 
166. 
 59. 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984). 
 60. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizens Suits, Standing, and Environmental 
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 55 (2001). 
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congressional grant of standing.  Prior to Lujan, where it could be 
discerned, the Court had deferred to congressional intent with regard 
to the grant of standing.61  Lujan, then, seemingly casts the Court’s 
prior reasoning into doubt. 
III.  STANDING AS A NORMATIVE INQUIRY 
These holdings set the stage for the Court’s decision in Lujan, 
with its stringent articulation of the injury-in-fact test, examined 
above.  The Court in Lujan, recall, held that the injury-in-fact 
requirement demanded a showing that the injury affected the plaintiff 
in a “personal and individual way,”62 was “concrete and 
particularized,” “actual or imminent,” “not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”63 This stringent test made a finding of “as applied” 
unconstitutionally of citizens’ suit in environmental statutes 
practically a foregone conclusion – as Justice Scalia intended.  Such 
suits could be successful only if the plaintiff could also meet these 
stringent Article III requirements.64 
Because standing is a threshold question,65 the courts must make 
the determination concerning these three requirements 
independently of the governing law and before turning to the merits 
of the case.  If the Article III standing requirements were determined 
on the basis of the governing law, then the court would simply ask if 
 61. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially 
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1179 (1992).  For further support of 
this thesis, see also Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-48, 352-53 (1984); Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210-12 
(1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155-56 (1970); Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-76 (1940). 
 62. 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
 63. 504 U.S. at 560. 
 64. But what is the source of these requirements, and, in particular, of the injury-in-fact 
requirement? The short answer is that the Court invented them.  But they may have been led 
down that path by a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by 
Kenneth Culp Davis.  3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.02, at 211-
13 (1958).  See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 186. 
Note that the Court in Data Processing was interpreting the APA.  But interestingly, the 
opinion is actually unclear on whether the injury-in-fact test was meant to apply to the Court’s 
interpretation of the APA or to Article III standing.  Subsequent decisions, of course, have 
interpreted it as an Article III requirement.  In 1958, Davis misread the words “adversely 
affected or aggrieved” (and so having standing to challenge an agency decision) in the APA to 
mean injury “in fact.” But the words are not freestanding; they are followed by “within the 
meaning of a relevant statute.”  See APA, § I.C. 
 65. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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the plaintiff had a cause of action grounded in a legal source, either 
common law or statutory law.  If there was such a cause of action, the 
“case” or “controversy” requirement of Article III would be met.  
Where such a cause of action was missing, the case would be 
dismissed for lack of standing. 
But the Supreme Court has set Article III standing requirements 
as a threshold question, and divorced the inquiry into injury-in-fact 
(as well as causation and redressability) from legal interest.66  The 
Court in Data Processing sought to move from a complex legal 
inquiry to a purely fact-based inquiry of whether there was a factual 
harm.67  But this separation is untenable.  It is inevitable, indeed 
logically necessary, that we rely on some standard to distinguish 
between what counts as an injury and what does not.  This is a value-
laden, normative inquiry.  To be sure, this notion is partially obscured 
by the fact that in many cases there are fairly well-established 
conventions on what counts as an injury.  In enacting statutes, 
legislatures often make value determinations or normative decisions 
about what ought to count as an injury, what sorts of harms ought to 
be redressable in the courts.  Likewise, with the common law, judges 
make these determinations, often appealing to such norms as equity 
or justice. 
The question of what is an injury is a normative inquiry because 
it depends upon an individual’s understanding of the way something 
ought to be and ought to function (how, say, a human body ought to 
exist and function, or the way tree or ecosystem ought to exist and 
function, etc.).  Such an understanding depends deeply on what we 
believe the purpose of such entities are (e.g., does an ecosystem exist, 
finally, for the human good? Or does it have a broader purpose or 
purposes, quite independent of the human good?).  An injury to an 
entity, then, is a deviation, or a pathology, from the way that entity 
ought to exist or function (i.e., a deviation from our normative 
vision).  This is essentially a metaphysical inquiry, and far from being 
value-free, it implicates the deepest of our values.  Even if we restrict 
ourselves to human beings, what is an injury is far from clear.  Does 
someone who fears that the river is polluted in the absence of any 
scientific evidence suffer a concrete, factual injury?  Does someone 
 66. See, e.g., Ass’n  of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
 67. Id.  See also, Sunstein, supra note 21, at 188 (arguing that “[t]he Data Processing Court 
appears to have thought that it was greatly simplifying matters by shifting from a complex 
inquiry of law (is there a legal injury?) to an exceedingly simple, law-free inquiry into fact (is 
there a factual harm?)”). 
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who finds deeply offensive, and so offers a legal challenge to, the 
grant of tax deductions to racially segregated schools suffer a 
concrete, factual injury?  Does an individual who feels deep sorrow 
over the threatened loss of a species suffer a concrete, factual injury?  
Does someone who cares deeply about animals, upon seeing them 
treated cruelly, suffer a concrete, factual injury?  The Supreme Court 
has answered these questions in various ways because the injury-in-
fact standard cannot not actually provide guidance as between people 
with differing normative worldviews.  By stripping “injury” from its 
legal grounding, the Supreme Court has unmoored the term from any 
common reference point.  That is, how individuals answer the 
question “what is an injury in fact?” implicates their normative vision 
of reality; the term  “injury” becomes highly mutable because it is a 
depository that refracts these differing worldviews. 
To be sure, the underlying logic of Lujan, with its three 
constitutional requirements for Article III standing, remains the law 
of the land.  And these requirements were reinforced by several cases 
that came after Lujan.68  However, the Court has not consistently 
followed the stringent version of the injury-in-
fact/causation/redressability test set out in Lujan.  In 2000, the 
Supreme Court held that the citizens’ suit plaintiffs in Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.69 did have 
Article III standing.  The lower court had found “repeatedly, 
 68. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1998).  In this 
case, the Court emphasized, 
 [T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three requirements. . . . 
First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proven) an ‘injury in fact’ – a 
harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical. . . .  Second, there must be causation – a fairly traceable connection 
between the plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant . . .  And 
third, there must be redressability – a likelihood that the requested relief will redress 
the alleged injury.  This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes 
the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking 
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.” 
Id.  (internal citations and quotations omitted.) 
The Court held that the plaintiff company could not meet the stringent redressability 
requirement on its request for information about toxic releases under a right-to-know statute 
because none of the relief requested “would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by 
the late reporting, or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.” Id. at 105-
06 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Therefore, the plaintiff had no Article III 
standing, despite the presence of a citizens’ suit provision in the governing law.  See generally 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).  The New York Times has noted that the Supreme 
Court’s trend of tightening standing requirements was one of the “most profound setbacks for 
the environmental movement in decades.” William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool Is 
Being Upset by Court, NY TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A1, cited in Adler, supra note 60, at 39. 
 69. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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Laidlaw’s discharges exceeded the limits set by the permit.  In 
particular, despite experimenting with several technological fixes, 
Laidlaw consistently failed to meet the permit’s stringent 1.3 ppb 
(parts per billion) daily average limit on mercury discharges.  The 
District Court later found that Laidlaw had violated the mercury 
limits on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995.”70  The district court 
had found that Friends of the Earth (FOE) had standing, and though 
it denied injunctive and declaratory relief, it did issue a civil penalty 
against Laidlaw. 
However, the district court also explicitly found, despite the 
violations, “There has been no demonstrated proof of harm to the 
environment.”71  Additionally, the district court found, “[T]he overall 
quality of the river exceeds levels necessary to support propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreation in and on the water.  The 
fish tissue studies . . . showed levels of mercury in the sampled fish 
well below the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) action 
level . . .”72  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after 
assuming without deciding the issue of standing, ordered the case 
dismissed for mootness, noting Laidlaw’s subsequent compliance with 
the permits.73  The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
finding of mootness because “[a] defendant’s voluntary cessation of 
allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a 
case.”74 
Laidlaw contended that FOE lacked standing because there was 
no injury-in-fact.  To support their standing claim, the plaintiffs 
offered affidavits from local residents.  For instance, one residence 
claimed that, as a boy, he camped and fished near the river three to 
fifteen miles south of Laidlaw’s plant.  However, he wouldn’t do that 
anymore because “he was concerned that the water was polluted by 
Laidlaw’s discharges.”75  He also stated that the river looked and 
smelled polluted.  Other residents gave similar statements.  For 
example, another resident maintained that before Laidlaw came, she 
used to walk near the river, wade in, picnic, and bird watch.  But “she 
 70. Id. at 176 (citing the lower court’s decision, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997)). 
 71. Friends of the Earth, 956 F.Supp. at 602. 
 72. Id. at 600. 
 73. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 n.4 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
 74. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 174. 
 75. Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
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no longer engaged in these activities in or near the river because she 
was concerned about harmful effects from discharged pollutants.”76  
The thrust of the injury claimed in these affidavits are the individuals’ 
subjective apprehensions and fears that Laidlaw’s discharges may be 
affecting water quality, despite the lack of scientific support for these 
fears. 
In spite of this subjective basis for the claim of injury, the 
majority, by a 7-2 vote, found that FOE had standing to sue.  The 
majority held, “The relevant showing for purposes of Article III 
standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the 
plaintiff.”77  The Court explicitly held, then, that there need be no 
injury to the environment to support citizen-suit standing.  The 
plaintiff’s mere knowledge that a permit was violated, which in turn 
resulted in fear and that subjective fear lessened the “aesthetic and 
recreational values of the area” for the plaintiff, was enough to grant 
standing.78  There was no scientifically supported deterioration in 
water quality and no increased risk of ingestion of chemicals; there 
was nothing but the plaintiffs’ subjective fears based on technical 
permit violations.  These subjective fears, where they impact plaintiffs 
activities and enjoyment, are apparently enough to support a finding 
of injury-in-fact.  As one commentator points out, this is a long way 
from the concrete, particularized injury required in Defenders: 
“‘Injury-in-fact’ became injury in fiction.”79 
Typically, as Scalia points out in the dissent, the environmental 
plaintiff claims that the harm to the environment harmed the plaintiff.  
Scalia notes, 
. . . harm to the environment is not enough to satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how he 
personally was harmed.  In the normal course, however, a lack of 
demonstrable harm to the environment will translate, as it plainly 
does here, into a lack of demonstrable harm to citizen plaintiffs.  
While it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could be harmed even 
though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would have the 
burden of articulating and demonstrating the nature of that injury.  
Ongoing ‘concerns’ about the environment are not enough, for it is 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 181. 
 78. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). 
 79. Adler, supra note 60, at 56. 
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the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the 
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.80 
The majority, in a sense, turned on its head the typical use of the 
claim that it is harm to the plaintiff, and not the environment, that is 
relevant to standing.  Usually, this means that the harm to the 
environment must be severe enough to also have harmed the plaintiff.  
But the majority in Laidlaw empties the claim of meaning by holding 
that there need be no harm to the environment or threat human 
health for the plaintiff to have suffered injury-in-fact due to technical 
violation of discharge permits.  Subjective fear is enough. 
Even though Laidlaw, in one sense, represents a victory for 
environmentalists insofar as standing requirements seem to have been 
relaxed.  Yet it is troubling that the standing doctrine made the well-
being of the river, in significant measure, irrelevant.  It was human 
subjective fears about pollution to the river, unmoored from actual 
harm to the river or the environment that allowed the court to hear 
the case.  Insofar as it focuses such exclusive attention on these fears 
as its basis for the finding of injury-in-fact, this case illustrates what is 
wrong with the standing doctrine from the perspective of the 
environmentalist.  The environment has been so instrumentalized by 
the standing doctrine that harm to the environment can actually be 
left entirely out of the picture by the court deciding whether an 
environmental plaintiff has standing to sue, ostensibly to engage as 
“private attorneys general” to protect the environment.  In the Court 
portrayal of this case, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what is 
being redressed in this case is not harm to the environment but harm 
to the plaintiffs’ psyches caused by their beliefs about the 
environment.  The environment is merely a stage, a background, on 
which the ethically salient, and exclusively human, activity takes 
place. 
This is not to impugn the integrity of the plaintiffs in this case.  It 
is to impugn a judicial system that forces plaintiffs to argue in terms 
of harm to themselves, when their primary motivation may well be 
ethical concern for the well-being of a river, an ecosystem, or other 
life.  In Laidlaw, plaintiffs should have been free to sue for Laidlaw’s 
failure to meet the permit requirements.  But such standing should be 
understood as the result of a congressional grant of standing, of a 
statutory cause of action.  The plaintiffs were given a cause of action 
 80. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
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by the Clean Water Act’s citizens’ suit provision when Laidlaw 
repeatedly failed to meet the requirements of the permit that they 
were issued. 
Another post-Lujan case that displays the split in the Court, and 
the malleability of the standing requirements, is Massachusetts v. 
EPA.81  In this case, the Court held that Massachusetts had standing 
to sue the EPA for failing to offer a statutorily authorized rationale 
for its refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles.  
The state’s claimed injury was the loss of its shoreline, purportedly 
due to the rising sea level caused by global warming.  But there was 
conflicting testimony in the record on whether subsidence was at least 
a partial cause of the shoreline loss.  Further, tailpipe emissions of 
carbon dioxide in the United States account for only six percent of 
the worldwide emissions and new regulations would, realistically, only 
marginally impact this small percentage.  To claim that the loss of 
shoreline is an injury-in-fact caused by the EPA’s failure to regulate 
new vehicles’ carbon dioxide emissions seems a bit of a stretch of 
these concepts of injury-in-fact and causation.  (The majority basically 
reasoned that every little bit counts, and big problems have to be 
tackled one step at a time.)  Chief Justice Roberts claimed in his 
dissent, with some justification, that the Court’s decision “recalls the 
previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements.”82  He 
points out the speculative nature of the injury as the injury caused by 
the failure of the EPA to regulate new vehicle emissions.83 
But the primary problem is the Court’s doctrine of standing 
itself.  The divorce of the Article III, and especially the injury-in-fact 
requirement, from any statutory cause of action – that is, making 
standing an independent threshold question – not only untethers 
standing from its historical and constitutional bounds and imposes a 
value theory that is highly contested, it is also conceptually untenable 
(and results in the “looseness” and “manipulability” that the Chief 
Justice refers to).  To determine what counts as an injury requires a 
 81. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 82. Id. at 1470-71.  Chief Justice Roberts was referring to the Court’s decision in United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).  
The Chief Justice continues, “Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of 
Article III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable they are if not taken seriously 
as a matter of judicial self-restraint.”  Id.  He is entirely right on the manipulability of the 
requirements.  But what he means by “judicial self-restraint” is less clear.  Perhaps he means 
continued use of the requirements to advance the conservative justices anti-environmental 
agenda. 
 83. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1470. 
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normative framework for determining how something ought to be or 
ought to function.  In short, what counts as an injury depends on 
one’s worldview.  It’s a small wonder that standing has become the 
locus of powerful ideological differences.  What counts as an injury to 
a conservative may differ markedly from what counts as an injury to a 
liberal precisely because their worldviews, their views of the way the 
world ought to be, differ markedly. 
In addition to its logical problems, the current standing doctrine 
finds little support in either the Constitution or history. 
IV.  STANDING IN THE  
CONSTITUTION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 
Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”84  The text of the Constitution provides 
little guidance on how these terms are to be interpreted.  Article III 
does not refer to standing or injury-in-fact.  Article III requires a case 
or controversy, which likely requires some law (either common law or 
statute) to provide a cause of action, but any further requirements do 
not come from the text of the Constitution. 
And history belies the claim that these requirements are deep-
seated in American jurisprudence.  Vindication of the rule of law, the 
undifferentiated public interest in the faithful execution of the law, 
have long been viewed as the proper province of the citizen plaintiff – 
contrary to modern standing law.85  As Louis Jaffe summarized his 
historical survey in 1961, “the public action – an action brought by a 
private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the 
enforcement of public obligations – has long been a feature of our 
English and American law.”86  In 1875, for instance, the Supreme 
Court was presented with a petition for a writ of mandamus (or a 
court command) by private citizens to compel a federally chartered 
railroad to build a railroad line.87  The Court allowed the action to go 
forward even though the Court maintained that the petitioners were 
 84. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. 
 85. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
 86. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
255, 302 (1961). 
 87. Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875). For more detailed analysis, see 
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1404-05 (1987). 
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seeking to enforce “a duty to the public generally” and had “no 
interest other than what belonged to others.”88 
Congress’ creation of the qui tam action and informers’ action 
also undercut the view that Article III bars congressionally 
authorized citizen actions.89  Early Congress created numerous qui 
tam statutes, with the purpose of giving citizens the right to bring civil 
suits to help enforce criminal law.  Under the qui tam action, a citizen 
could bring suit against those who violated the law.  Many statutes in 
the first decade of the nation’s existence allowed for qui tam actions; 
these included statutes criminalizing the slave trade with other 
nations90 and criminalizing liquor importation without the payment of 
duties.91  As the Supreme Court explained in 1905, “[s]tatutes 
providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no 
interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, 
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this 
country ever since the foundation of our government.”92  Similarly, 
early Congress created informers’ action, through which private 
citizens could bring suit to enforce public duties and keep a share of 
the resulting fine or damages.  The informers’ action could be applied 
both against private individuals and public officers.93  There is no 
evidence in the historical record that anyone harbored any doubts 
about the constitutionality of what were in essence citizens’ suits.94 
Of course, both the qui tam action and the informers’ action 
generally allowed the plaintiff a monetary award, and in that sense, 
differ from modern citizens’ suits.  The award of a bounty did not 
create an injury where none existed before, but rather served as an 
incentive to carry out desired action.95 Further, mandamus suits were 
allowed, but did not involve the exchange of money.  And the very 
 88. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U.S. at 354. 
 89. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 87, at 1391; Sunstein, supra note 21, 174-76; Winter, supra 
note 58, at 156-60.  These articles provide further analysis of these actions. 
 90. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 347, 349. 
 91. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209.  See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 175, 
for further examples. 
 92. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905). 
 93. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 45. 
 94. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 175-76. 
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fact that no constitutional concerns were voiced about these stranger 
suits makes it unlikely that they, as such, were thought to be 
constitutionally problematic.  Early American law and judicial 
practices do not support the claim that there are constitutional limits 
on Congress’ authority to establish standing.  There is no hint of an 
Article III requirement of injury-in-fact in the text or in the historical 
record.  The Article III requirement of a case or controversy, read in 
light of the text of the Constitution as well as constitutional history, 
means nothing more than that some source of law must have 
conferred a cause of action for a given plaintiff to have standing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of its role, and the 
place of the doctrine of standing in maintaining that role, cannot 
withstand scrutiny.  It is not supported by the text of the Constitution, 
history, or logic.  Further, it is a usurpation of legislative prerogative 
and a violation of the separation of powers, rather than a bulwark 
against such violation.  Perhaps because of the Court’s anxiety to 
avoid having to rule on the category of cases represented in Lujan – 
those that are brought by plaintiffs who seek to force government 
agencies to obey the law – the Court crossed the boundary that 
separates the branches of government and made a vastly important 
public policy choice.  Specifically, the Court imposed a theory of 
value on the democratic polity in which human beings are the source 
and center of value.  At least in those cases where an agency fails to 
act, an individual is no longer allowed (1) to step forward and sue on 
behalf of an ecosystem or species that is injured (2) by activity that is 
prohibited by statute (3) even when that statute also grants citizen 
standing, (4) unless that individual can demonstrate that she herself is 
injured by the activity.  And it is this injury to the human individual 
that is judicially cognizable, and would likely be redressed by a 
favorable ruling.  The natural environment and other life become a 
mere backdrop for playing out of the human drama. 
The Supreme Court’s development of the injury-in-fact 
requirement for standing highlights this aspect of the value theory 
espoused by the Court: the Court endorses an anthropocentric value 
theory insofar as it is only injuries to human beings that “count.” 
This may be a viable value theory.  This may the value theory 
that we, the people, would choose.  But it is not a value theory that is 
mandated by the U.S. Constitution and it is not within the purview of 
the courts in a democratic polity, by any reasonable view of the role 
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of the courts, to force on the nation.  Far from being a bulwark to 
protect the separation of powers, the Supreme Court has employed 
the doctrine of standing to break down that separation and usurp the 
prerogatives of the legislative branch. 
The severing of injury-in-fact from legal injury transformed the 
court’s legal inquiry not into simple factual inquiry but rather into an 
extraordinarily complex metaphysical inquiry – an inquiry into the 
ultimate and more general nature of entities.  If we consider the 
notion of legal interest, then what counts as a legal interest and a legal 
injury can be clarified.  If the U.S. government drains the wetlands on 
federal lands, an individual does not, by that action alone, have a 
legal interest; consequently, that individual has no standing and there 
is no Article III case or controversy.  If, however, Congress passes a 
statute granting citizens standing to sue their government in order to 
protect wetlands, then Congress has granted a cause of action – a 
beneficial interest in wetlands and the legal right to sue for their 
protection. 
Congress, by creating a cause of action to complain against 
environmental destruction or racial discrimination, is granting 
individuals a legal interest in a certain state of affairs (say, clean air, 
or thriving species, or racial equality).  It is this legal interest by which 
courts judge if there is a cause of action, and so standing and an 
Article III “case” or “controversy.”  Severing the standing inquiry 
from the inquiry into whether there is legal interest was the primary 
wrong turn that has allowed the Supreme Court to use the standing 
doctrine for ideological purposes – both conservative (staunch, strict 
inquiry into injury-in-fact) and liberal (loose, diluted inquiry into 
injury-in-fact). 
To move the Court out of the policy-making arena, the current 
doctrine of standing should be jettisoned for a more structured, 
predictable, and less ideologically driven inquiry into whether the 
plaintiff presents a cause of action.  Such a development would take 
the courts out of the business of imposing a contested value theory on 
the democratic polity and restore the proper balance between the 
branches of government. 
